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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of food crises–large and sudden increases in food prices–on asset
liquidation. Substantial research exists on household food insecurity as a result of a food crisis,
but studies on households’ coping strategies have so far been limited to natural shocks such as
flood, drought, and financial crises. In this paper, I use an adapted version of the asset-based
poverty trap model to explain households’ use of asset liquidation as a coping strategy when faced
with food crises. To test my theory, I employ a household-level panel data set from Tanzania
that covers the years 2008, 2010, and 2012. I estimate fixed effects regressions of productive and
unproductive asset levels on a measure of household-specific food prices. I find no statistically
significant evidence in support of asset liquidation. My results suggest an asset smoothing behavior
across all types of households.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Between December 2007 and June 2008, a multitude of demand and supply factors caused
international food prices to skyrocket, a shock commonly referred to as the 2007/08 global food
crisis. In the span of six months, rice prices tripled and wheat prices doubled (Christiaensen, 2009).
Tiwari and Zaman (2010) claim that 63 million individuals might have become malnourished in
2008 as a result of the price spikes. In general, the literature suggests a strong negative impact
on most Sub-Saharan African countries. A study by Headey (2013) finds that the largest increase
in self-assessed food insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa occurred in Tanzania, where 23% of the
population became more insecure as a result of the food price spike. While the impact of the crisis
on food security has been widely studied, little attention has been paid to specific coping strategies
households might use to counter the negative effects of the shock.
Some empirical studies suggest that, in some cases, households use informal loans from rel-
atives and friends or sell their assets to cope with negative shocks that have an income effect
(Arndt et al., 2008; D’Souza and Jolliffe, 2012; Lawson and Kasirye, 2013). Other papers explore
households’ decisions to smooth consumption or smooth assets under the framework of asset-based
poverty trap and find evidence of a dynamic asset-level threshold at which households split into
consumption smoothers and asset smoothers (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Hodinott, 2006; Carter and
Lybbert, 2012). So far, all these studies have focused on financial crises and natural shocks such as
droughts and floods, and theoretical models explaining coping strategies have only addressed rural
households’ behaviors.
This research is important because understanding how households choose to cope is key to
designing safety nets that assist vulnerable populations at times of price shocks. I combine the
asset-based poverty trap model with an agricultural household model in a framework that includes
both rural and urban households and introduces food price spikes as a shock. My theory suggests
that the extent to which households liquidate their assets to cope with the crises depends on their
levels of assets and on the amount of food they produce.
I test my theoretical predications using detailed household data from the Living Standards Mea-
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surement Study (LSMS) on Tanzania. I construct household specific asset indices and price indices
and estimate a regression equation of asset levels on the lagged values of food price indices and
control variables. The general results suggest all types of households smooth assets when faced
with adverse food price shocks. I find no statistically significance evidence in support of asset
liquidation as a coping strategy.
The rest of the paper proceeds in five steps. Section 2 reviews the literature on the effects of
food crisis and households’ coping mechanisms. Section 3 proposes a household decision-making
theory. Section 4 presents the data and the summary statistics of the main variables used in my
regressions. Sections 5 and 6 present an empirical strategy and the results, respectively. Section 7
concludes the study, discusses some limitations, and offers directions for future research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Household coping strategies have mostly been studied in the context of financial crises and
natural shocks such as drought and flood and have found varying results.
Theoretical papers have studied households’ coping strategies by looking at poverty dynamics.
The frameworks used in these theoretical papers have come to be known as asset-based poverty
trap theory. This theory is based on the idea of a dynamic asset-based poverty threshold at which
households split into asset-smoothers and consumption smoothers in their wealth accumulation
trajectories (Carter and Barrett, 2006). It assumes that households have limited access to financial
markets from which to borrow and thus make a decision to either smooth consumption or smooth
assets when faced with shocks. Carter and Lybbert (2012) reassess the intertemporal asset man-
agement problem with a poverty trap model in rural Burkina Faso and confirm the split of wealth
accumulation trajectories; they find that any given sample of households may be comprised of two
distinctive behavioral regimes, consumption smoothers and asset smoothers. They claim that the
high marginal value of assets in the neighborhoods of critical wealth levels makes households in
these neighborhoods reluctant to liquidate assets even in the face of economic shocks (Carter and
Lybbert, 2012).
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These two studies suggest models assessing households’ decisions to smooth consumption or
smooth assets when faced with shocks and test them using simulations. Zimmerman and Carter
(2003) propose a stochastic dynamic programming model to explain savings and portfolio deci-
sions in a resource-poor environment where agents face risk and subsistence constraints. Results
from their simulations show that poorer agents acquire low-risk and low-return buffer assets such
as stored grains and jewelery and pursue asset smoothing (maintain their assets) when faced with
shocks rather than consumption smoothing. By adopting this defensive attitude, the poor are able
to mitigate the risks associated with productive assets. Wealthier agents, on the other hand, invest
in high-risk, high-return productive assets such as livestock and land and pursue conventional con-
sumption smoothing, when confronted with shocks. Similarly, Hoddinott (2006) studies poverty
dynamics and explore asset smoothing versus consumption smoothing at times of income shocks in
rural Zimbabwe. He considers livestock as the principal asset held by these households, examining
whether livestock liquidation was used to smooth consumption following the 1994-1995 drought.
His findings suggest that droughts cause households with high initial levels of wealth to draw down
assets. For instance, more than half the households owning more than two oxen sold at least one
ox in the aftermath of the drought compared to 15 per cent of households owning only one or two
oxen.
A few empirical papers test the predictions of the asset-based poverty trap theory. Giesbert and
Schindler (2012) explore this theory in rural Mozambique and compare the effects of strategies
drawing on assets (to smooth consumption) and strategies drawing on consumption (to smooth
assets). Their results suggest that in the short run, food-insecure households that can afford to draw
on unproductive assets are able to sustain their productive asset base.
Other empirical papers have explored the use of credit, asset liquidation, and consumption di-
versity to mitigate the negative impact of financial shocks and have find opposing results. D’Souza
and Jolliffe’s (2012) study of food-based coping strategies during the 2008 food crisis inAfghanistan
suggests that households move toward staple food, and away from nutrient-abundant food, and thus
trade off quality for quantity. Other studies have documented coping mechanisms at times of natu-
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ral, economic, and health shocks. Rankin, Aytak, and Kavakli (2013) claim that 25% of households
were forced to liquidate assets or take more debt, and 25% received financial support from their
relatives in Turkey during the 2008 economic crisis. Lawson and Kasirye (2013) argue that house-
holds are more likely to reduce their food consumption when confronted with a drought and sell
their assets when confronted with floods in Rwanda. Goh, Kang, and Sawada (2005) find that
neither credit nor liquidation of assets served as coping devices in the initial phase of the 1997
financial crisis, possibly because of the credit crunch and asset price decline that resulted from the
crisis. Yilma (2014) finds that economic and natural shocks were more likely to trigger dissaving
and a reduction in food consumption than sale of assets and borrowing from informal sources in
Ethiopia. Health shocks have the opposite effect (Yilma, 2014).
In sum, studies have found evidence in support of asset liquidation in the literature. Studies
that have assessed these coping strategies under the framework of asset-based poverty trap suggest
that relatively asset-poor households whose asset levels near a certain threshold experience a high
marginal utility of assets that incentivizes asset smoothing, while wealthier household smooth con-
sumption. Empirical papers indicate that households’ coping behaviors with regards to assets vary
from shock to shock.
In this paper, I explore an income shock originating from food price spikes, taking into ac-
count potential positive benefits for food producers. I contribute to the literature by combining the
agricultural household model and asset-based poverty trap theory in an analysis that includes both
rural and urban households and introduces food price spikes as origin of the shock. Given urban
households tend to possess relatively higher levels of unproductive assets, I test whether a criti-
cal threshold exists in terms of unproductive assets and where households split into consumption
smoothers and asset smoothers. Furthermore, unlike droughts and floods, food price spikes can be
advantageous to households that produce food. My paper thus addresses potential heterogeneity in
coping behavior due to differentials in food production. In the next section, I propose a theory of
asset-based coping behavior for different types of households.
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3. THEORY
3.1. Intuition
I start by providing the intuition behindmymodel. Consider three arbitrary households that face
credit constraints. All three households earn a fixed labor income and consume a set of commodities
(maize, cassava, rice, wheat, sorghum) that they may or may not produce. The households trade in
the commodities market as net-buyers or a net-sellers.
Household 1 lives in the Mbeya region, a maize growing area in rural Tanzania, and is a net-
producer of maize. To produce maize, the household has access to a high and a low productivity
technology. The low productivity technology consists of traditional farming equipment such as
horses, ploughs, and harrows. The high productivity technology consists of equipment such as
tractors, modern planters, and irrigation systems and is associated with higher returns to assets.
Total output per acre is higher under the high technology. However, in order to adopt the high
technology, the household must incur the fixed costs of gathering the necessary assets for the tech-
nology such that its total returns are greater under the low technology until a minimum level of
capital is acquired. Around this minimum, the marginal value of productive assets becomes high
due to the opportunity cost associated with the inability to use the high technology. Household
1, similar to other households, also needs to keep a socially acceptable minimum level of unpro-
ductive assets. These might consist of a set of cooking utensils, Beds or mattresses for sleeping, a
television for entertainment, a couple of Chairs and a couple of Books (perhaps religious). Around
this minimum, the marginal value of assets becomes high due to the social costs of falling short.
Household 2 lives in Dar Es Salaam, is a net-consumer of maize, and has low levels of produc-
tive assets but high levels of unproductive assets (substantially above the minimum social require-
ment). Household 3 lives in Dodoma, is a net-consumer of maize and has low levels of productive
assets and low levels of unproductive assets (around the minimum social requirement).
What happens to these three households when maize prices suddenly skyrocket? How do they
cope with the shock, given credit constraints? Because household 1 produces more maize than it
consumes and trades the surplus for money, price increases will be advantageous. Household 1 is
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better off than before and thus needs no coping strategies against the shock. Household 2 and 3 are
worse off because their purchasing power is diminished and their wage income is fixed. My theory
predicts that household 2 copes by selling its extra unproductive assets to smooth consumption since
the marginal value of these extra assets above the minimum social requirement is small. Household
3 reduces consumption to smooth assets since the marginal value of its assets is too high for the
household to consider selling them off.
The next subsection formalizes these ideas.
3.2. Household Coping Model
Consider a farm or non-farm credit-constrained household that earns a fixed labor income,
possesses assets, consumes a set of commodities that they may or may not produce, and trades in
the commodities market. The model below shows the utility maximization problem the household
faces and was adapted from and Carter and Lybbert (2012). Households maximize the present value
of their utility over an infinite horizon by choosing how much to consume in the current period and
howmany assets to carry forward into the next period, given food prices, and subject to a number of
constraints. The use of infinite horizon is common in the literature and is based on the assumption
that parents are concerned about their children’s welfare (Carter and Zimmerman, 2003).
max
c0;T1;M1
E0
 1X
t=0
tu(ct)jp
!
subject to
p ct  t   (Tt+1 Tt)  (Mt+1 Mt)
(p) = F (Tt) pt + F (Mt)
F (Tt) = max

F (Tt)
H ; F (Tt)
L

]
F (Mt) = max

(rt)
H ; (rt)
L

]Mt
Lt  0 8 t;
(1)
where t denotes the time period,  is the rate of time preference, M is the household’s
holding of unproductive assets, T is the household’s holding of productive assets,  is the
household’s profits from farming, and r denotes fixed returns on assets. The last equation in the
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model implies that households are credit-constrained, as it reflects the inability to hold negative
assets (loans).
The first equation after ”subject to” is the budget constraint. It reflects income from production
() and income from asset liquidation (given by the difference between assets in the current and
future period). It implies that households that produce more than they consume will benefit from
a price increase. Households that benefit from the shock need not make coping decisions. Those
that are negatively impacted need to make a decision to liquidate assets to smooth consumption or
to reduce consumption to smooth assets.
Asset-based poverty trap models suggest that there is a threshold level of productive assets
aroundwhich agricultural households split into consumption smoothers and asset smoothers (Carter
and Zimmerman, 2003). Following Carter and Lybbert (2012), let’s assume this occurs as a result
of households having access to a high and low productivity technology. Marginal returns to assets
are always greater under the ‘high’ (H) than under the ‘low’ (L) technology:
F (Tt) = max

F (Tt)
H ; F (Tt)
L

] (2)
@F (T )H
@TH
 @F (T )
L
@TL
: (3)
However, the high technology is associated with fixed costs such that total return is greater
under the low technology until a minimum level of capital T  is attained:
F (T )H  F (T )H 8 T  T : (4)
This assumption implies a discontinuous jump in the marginal value of productive assets at
point T .
In order to incorporate unproductive assets, I further assume that there is a minimum level of
unproductive asset stock,M 1. Below this level of assets, households earn a rate of return, rL, and
above it, they experience a rate of return rH , where rH  rL. That is:
1This is an expansion of the models in the literature to include unproductive assets. Liquidating unproductive assets
in favor of more productive assets might be a justifiable decision in the face of price spikes.
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rL < rH 8 T M: (5)
In other words, households earn a relatively low rate of return until their assets reach a certain
minimum, creating another discontinuous jump occurs in the marginal value of unproductive assets
at pointM.
This dynamic choice problem is not separable in time since future utility may depend on current
consumption. The complexity of time-inseparable models grows exponentially with the number of
periods since the optimization problem must be solved simultaneously (Carter and Zimmerman,
2003). It is standard in the literature to define a state variable Lt that captures past consumption. It
is defined as 0 if the agent has had zero consumption and as 1, otherwise. The utility maximizing
problem can be thought of as a choice of household consumption in the current period that maxi-
mizes the sum of the utility enjoyed from the consumption and the utility from their asset stocks to
be carried forward to the next period, taking into account their level of impatience.
Following Lybbert and Carter (2012), let J(L) be a function that represent the value function
of accumulable asset stock (L). The optimization problem can be rewritten as:
(6)max
c0;T1;M1;L1
E0
 
(c0) + 
tj  (T1;M1; L1)

This problem must be solved numerically since it doesn’t have a closed form solution. Using
numerical methods on samples of rural households, theoretical papers have found a threshold level
of productive assets at which households split into consumption smoothers and asset smoothers
due to sudden increases in the marginal value of assets around the threshold. This paper develops
a number of hypothesizes. Higher food prices might render investment in productive assets more
lucrative thereby incentivizing rich households to liquidate unproductive assets in favor of produc-
tive assets. Thus, an unproductive asset Micawber threshold might be plausible. Furthermore, it
might be unnecessary for net-food producers to cope against adverse price shocks by liquidating
assets, because they experience a net-positive change in income. In other words, the higher the
stock of food production of the household, the less willing households must be to liquidate assets
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when averse food price shocks occur. To test these hypotheses, I introduce food price shocks and
examine their effect on the level of both unproductive and productive assets for households with
varying level of wealth, taking into account their productive capabilities.
The next section presents the data used to test my hypotheses and relevant summary statistics.
4. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
I use household data from the three rounds of the Tanzania National Panel Survey (TZNPS).
These nationally representative surveys are a part of the Living Standards Measurement – Inte-
grated Surveys (LSMS – IS) conducted by the World Bank. The fist round of the TZNPS was
implemented between October 2008 and 2009 and covered 3,265 households and 16,707 individu-
als. The second round was implemented between October 2010 and September 2011 and covered
new households in addition to all the households in the first round for a total of 3,924 households
and 20,559 individuals. The third and most recent round was conducted between October 2012
and November 2013 and covered all the households in the previous two waves for a total of 5,010
households and 25,412 individuals.
4.1. The Asset Indices
Facing data constraints, researchers have used counts of assets as a measure of a households’ as-
set ownership, assigning equal weights to all asset items (McKenzie, 2004). However, this method
fails to take into account varying levels of returns associated with different asset items. Tractors
for instance must be assigned a greater weighter than harrows. In this paper, I construct weighted
productive and unproductive asset indices, where the weights are assigned using the first principal
component from principal component analysis (PCP). This is a pragmatic approach to measuring
inequalities in asset ownership given data constraints (McKenzie, 2004). The first principal com-
ponent yields the weights for each household to provide maximum discrimination between house-
holds, with larger weights being given to assets that vary most across households. For instance, an
asset owned by all the households will be given zero weight as it explains none of the variations
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across the households, whereas an asset owned by few households (such as tractors) will be given
a larger weight. Given the lack of availability of price data, this method generates more sensible
asset indices that assigning equal weight to all households items.
(7)it =
jX
j=1
wijtAijt; for household i at time t
Using the unproductive asset indices, I classify the households as unproductive asset-rich if
their levels of unproductive assets are greater than the median unproductive asset level. I define
similar categories using the productive asset indices. Tables 1-2 show the mean counts of unpro-
ductive assets by household type (unproductive asset-rich and unproductive asset-poor). Tables 3
represents the mean counts of productive assets by household type (productive asset-rich and pro-
ductive asset-poor). In the general, these two tables indicate that rich households have more assets
that poor households. For instance, unproductive asset-rich households own an average of approx-
imately 3 beds whereas unproductive-asset poor households own an average of approximately 2
beds. Productive asset-rich households have an average of approximately 7 educated members2
whereas productive asset-poor households have an average of approximately 4 educated members.
4.2. Food Expenditure and Price Indices
The LSMS-IS data include both food consumption and food production modules. The “food
consumption” module contains, for a list of food items, the quantity consumed, the quantity con-
sumed from household production, the quantity consumed from purchases, and the total expenditure
on the items during that week. Table 4 compares the mean expenditure (in Tanzanian Shillings)
by item for households with low and high unproductive assets. Table 5 compares the mean expen-
diture by food item for households with low and high productive assets. It appears in both tables
that maize and rice are the most consumed staples. As expected, consumption by asset-rich house-
holds is greater than consumption by asset-poor households for almost all the items. For instance,
2This is defined as the number of adult-age household members who have at least completed primary school.
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unproductive asset-poor households consume husked rice worth 2545 TZS (roughly 1.14 dollars)
whereas unproductive asset-rich households consume twice that amount.
Based on these food expenditure data, I construct household-specific weighted indices, where
the weights represent the proportion of total food expenditure spent on each of the five main sta-
ple food items. The price indices were then calculated by computing the change in these prices
with 2008 as base year. Since households consume staples in different proportions, a household-
specific weighted index more reflects price shocks more accurately than a common price index.
This approach could potentially induce bias, because the levels of assets of a household can affect
the total amount of food expenditure and expenditure on specific food items. I address this issue in
the robustness checks by constructing community-level weighted price indices.
In my regressions, I standardize the price indices around the mean for a more intuitive interpre-
tation of the results. The value of each index thus represents the number of standard deviations of
a household’s asset (price) index above or below the mean asset (price) level for the sample.
4.3. Production Variables
The “agricultural production” module includes, for a list of production items, the amount pro-
duced, the amount sold, the value of the sales, the amount in storage, and the amount lost. Table
6 displays the value of food sales (in Tanzanian Shillings) by item for unproductive-asset rich
and poor households, and 7 shows the value of food sales (in Tanzanian Shillings) by item for
productive-asset rich and poor households. Maize is the most produced staple, followed by rice.
4.4. Overall summary statistics
Tables 8 and 9 compare summary statistics for asset variables and explanatory variables by
household type. For both types of assets, asset levels are higher for the rich than for the poor,
as expected. For instance, the mean unproductive asset level for rich households is two standard
deviations above the sample mean unproductive assets levels. The mean unproductive asset level
for rich households is one standard deviations below the sample mean unproductive assets levels
(table 8). Price indices are higher for unproductive asset-poor households compared to unproduc-
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tive asset-rich households, with the opposite being true for productive-asset poor and productive
asset-rich households. As expected households that are rich in productive assets produce more than
households that are poor in productive assets (table 9). All types of households tend to be led by
men. Household size and gender of household head are similar across households.
4.5. Asset-smoothing versus consumption smoothing
Figure 1 shows the kernel density plot of unproductive asset levels by household type. As
expected, the distribution of assets for asset-rich households is centered around a higher mean and is
more spread out that the distribution of assets for asset-poor households. Similarly, Figure 2 shows
the kernel density plot of productive asset levels by household type. The distribution of assets for
asset-rich households is centered around a higher mean, but the spreads spreads are comparable.
In the next section, I present an empirical strategy to capture the effects of adverse price shocks,
when controlling for various covariates.
Figure 1: Unproductive asset levels by household type
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Figure 2: Productive asset levels by household type
5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
I estimate a household fixed effects regression of asset levels the lagged values of the the price
indices and control variables, using the following specification.
(8)Ait = 0 + 1PriceIndexit 1 + 2ProductionV alueit 1 + 3PriceIndexit 1 ProductionV alueit 1 + 4Xit 1 + 6Ji + 7Yt + it 1;
where Ait is the household’s asset level assets at time t. PriceIndexit 1 is the household-
specific price index in the previous period. For easiness of interpretation, asset indices and price
indices are standardized around the population mean, so that each index measures the number
of standard deviations the household is away from this population mean3. Xit 1 is a vector of
household characteristics–head gender and age, household size in the previous period. Ji are the
household fixed effects and control for time-invariant effects specific to each household. Yt are the
3The regressions with the non-standardized indices yield the same coefficient signs and significance.
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year fixed-effects and control for location invariant effects that are common to all the households.
it is the classical error term.
The household fixed effects control for time-invariant factors within a household that are not al-
ready controlled for by the demographics variables by the household characteristics variables. Year
fixed effects control for time changing factors that are common to all households. Lagged values
are used because households make dynamic decisions about their future assets and consumption
based on the present period. Therefore, changes in consumption smoothing and asset smoothing
behavior in one period reflect changes in conditions and the incidence of shocks in the previous
period.
I estimate equation 8 for the two types of asset indices and the two types of households for each
asset index. All the continuous variables are transformed into logs to correct for heteroskedasticity.
My theory suggests that the coefficient on the price index should be positive or zero for households
that have low levels of assets and negative for households that have high levels of assets. My
theory also implies that the greater the amount of food rich households produce, the more positive
the benefits of the price increase would be and thus the less they would be willing to liquidate
assets.
6. RESULTS
6.1. Main Results: using median to define the asset status groups
I estimate equation 8 twice for each type of asset, once for each household category. A house-
hold is defined as rich in each case if it possesses asset levels above the median asset level. Using
median values to categorize the households produces a natural split of the sample into two equal
categories to make comparison easier. I change the definition of the categories as a robustness
check in the next subsection. Table 10 uses a comprehensive productive and unproductive asset
indices. These indices incorporate all the assets listed in the summary statistics. Models 1 and 3
show the results for unproductive asset-poor and productive asset-poor households, respectively.
The coefficients on the price index variable suggest, for poor households, a one standard deviation
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increase in prices results in a 0.012 standard deviation decrease in unproductive assets and a 0.001
standard deviation increase in productive assets, both insignificant. Models 2 and 4 show the results
for unproductive asset-rich and productive asset-rich households, respectively. The coefficients on
the price index variable suggest, for rich households, a one standard deviation increase in prices
result in a 0.014 standard deviation increase in unproductive assets and a 0.025 standard deviation
increase in productive assets, both insignificant.
The coefficient on the price index variable on models 1-4 imply that both unproductive asset-
rich and poor households maintain their unproductive assets, and both productive asset-rich and
poor maintain their productive assets, when faced with price shocks. This provides evidence in
support asset smoothing across all types of assets and all types of households.
It is also useful to interpret the coefficient on production and the interaction of production and
price. In models 1 and, the coefficient estimates on production variables indicate that the higher
poor households produce, the higher their productive levels and the lower their unproductive assets
levels. Similar results are observed for rich households. However, none of these production effects
are significant.
In the next subsection, I perform robustness checks by altering my definition of poor and rich,
changing the composition of asset indices, and using a smaller set of staples.
6.2. Robustness check 1: using community-level weighted price indices
As explained earlier, the use of household-specific weighted price indices could induce bias
in my result, as asset levels likely have an influence on total food expenditure and expenditure
on specific food items. To address this issue, I construct community-level weighted price indices,
where the weights are the proportions of total food expenditure allocated to each food item. The
results are displayed on table 2. The coefficients are similar in magnitude and significance to the
coefficients in table 11, which alleviates my concerns on the use of household-specific price indices.
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6.3. Robustness check 2: using liquidatable assets
Comprehensive asset indices include items that might not be liquidatable. To test the robustness
of the estimates, I estimate the regressions using liquidatable asset indices 4 only (Table 12). These
assets are marked with an asterisk on tables 1-3. The productive index includes reapers, tractors,
poultry, and livestock (excludes labor). The unproductive index includes items such as bicycles,
phones, radio, tables etc. The results are practically the same as the previous results.
6.4. Robustness check 3: using cattle as assets
Household assets might be difficult to market at times of income shocks where the supply of
assets might cause asset prices to drop (Rankin et al., 2013). However, cattle might be easier to
market, as it is a common store of wealth among poor households. I estimate my regression model
using only cattle assets, which include poultry, livestock, and donkeys. The results are shown
on table 13. Model 13 represents the results for households with low cattle ownership (below
median ownership) and model 14 shows the results for households with high cattle ownership
(above median). Again, I find no evidence of asset liquidation among rich or poor households, as
the coefficients are not statistically different from 0.
6.5. Robustness check 4: using the 75th percentile to define the asset groups
Next, I define a household as rich in one type of asset if their asset level is greater than or equal
to the 75th percentile for the specific type of asset, and as poor otherwise. The results (Table 14)
are the same, which suggests a lack of variability in asset levels.
6.6. Robustness check 5: using maize, rice, and cassava in price indices
I perform a final robustness check by changing the staples included in the computation of price
index weights and production value. Instead of including the five most consumed commodities, I
now only include the top three commodities: maize, rice, and cassava. The main results (Table 15)
remain.
4In terms of unproductive indices, I assume that houses and landline phones are not liquidatable. In terms of
productive indices, I assume that lands/fields and labour are not liquidatable.
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7. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper investigates the effect of large and sudden increases in food prices such as those that
occurred worldwide between 2007 and 2009 on asset liquidation. I employ a detailed household-
level panel data set fromTanzania that covers the years 2008, 2010, and 2012 and compute household-
specific weighted price indices. Further, I construct a productive and an unproductive asset index
using principal component analysis and divide the sample into asset rich and asset poor subgroups.
My fixed effect regressions suggest households with low levels of assets smooth assets by reduc-
ing consumption. According to my theory, these outcomes occur because, for households with low
levels of assets, the marginal value of assets is so high that they would rather smooth assets by
decreasing consumption. I found no evidence in support of asset liquidation behavior from rich
households, as theory would suggest.
The first and foremost weakness of these results might be endogeneity caused by omitted vari-
ables such as covariant shocks such as floods, droughts, diseases etc. that I was not able to control
for. I cannot establish causality frommy results. The change in asset levels might be due to external
shocks that vary by region and thus affect households differently.
A second limitation of my paper is the method used to construct the asset indices. I used princi-
pal component analysis to assign a weight on each asset based on the variability in ownership. This
approach yields weights that provide maximum discrimination based on variance in ownership.
While this method yields a more plausible outcome than a method that assigns equal weight to all
types of assets, my results would have been more accurate with asset prices reflecting the values
of specific household asset items.
A third limitation is a lack of data. Givenmy panel data only includes three years, the variability
is assets is not significant, especially with the lag structure specified inmy empirical model. A panel
with more data could resolve this issue and perhaps lead to results that are more consistent with
theory.
Overall, my results are far from conclusive, but suggest a preference for asset smoothing over
consumption smoothing among (poor) households facing price shocks. Future research should
19
address the key limitations outlined above. Stronger evidence in support of asset smoothing would
help policymakers and governments identify those with low levels of assets that are most vulnerable
to changes in prices and provide them safety nets in times of food insecurity.
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